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A B S T R A C T
 
The pricing of IPOs is a challenging 
task among underwriters as they 
require resources from firms. Contrary 
to the non-financial information 
presented in a prospectus to set an 
offer price, pre-IPO accounting 
information could arguably influence 
IPO offer price. This study aims to 
investigate the relationship between 
leverage and IPO offer price. A cross-
sectional Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression was implemented to 
investigate the relationship between 
leverage and offer price based on 
a sample of 129 Malaysian IPOs 
issued between January 2009 and 
December 2018. As a result, it was 
proven that leverage was negatively 
related to offer prices. Accordingly, it 
was proposed in the findings that fit, 
which issued higher leverages prior to 
IPO listing, often posed high financial 
risks. Subsequently, underwriters and 
issuers set a lower price for IPOs to 
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1.     Introduction
Art or science is the possible pricing of IPOs. From the aspect of science, it 
involves the use of a quantitative model to determine the approximate worth of 
organisations. For instance, underwriters employ valuation model (relative or 
absolute method) to determine the approximate intrinsic value of firms (How et 
al., 2007; Kim & Ritter, 1999). In terms of the art aspect, underwriters determine 
offer prices by assessing the market conditions of IPOs and identifying the 
potential demand for IPO shares. Specifically, underwriters and issuers 
determine firms’ offer prices through the pricing mechanism. In emerging 
markets, specifically Malaysia, the majority of IPOs are issued through a fixed-
price mechanism (Tajuddin, Mohd-Rashid, Abdullah, & Abdul-Rahim, 2015). 
In this case, underwriters and issuers set the offer price of IPOs without taking 
the demands of potential investors into account. In this case, potential investors 
would face challenges in determining the firms’ values as they are informed 
asymmetrically. Nevertheless, the book-building mechanism has been more 
prevalent since 2002 despite the small number of organisations employing book-
building in pricing IPOs. Moreover, the book-building mechanism in Malaysia 
is adopted in a hybrid form, which comprises a combination of fixed-price and 
book-building mechanisms. Underwriters employ fixed-price mechanism in IPO 
pricing and allocation of shares to retail investors. Meanwhile, the IPO issued 
through book-building incorporates its valuation based on institutional investors. 
Theoretically, the IPO pricing should reflect its intrinsic value to encourage 
aftermarket buying and ensure a steady increase in price.
 It has been indicated in previous studies that fixed-price IPOs are under-
priced as compared to book-built IPOs. In the case of fixed-price IPOs, investors 
who receive share allocations ought to earn higher initial returns. This perception 
has become a concern among underwriters. Despite the issuers’ attempt of 
increasing IPO price in order to raise the proceeds from the IPOs, the underwriters 
are inclined to set a lower IPO price. Subsequently, low IPO price would be 
more appealing among potential investors, and a full subscription of IPO shares 
could be guaranteed. Therefore, setting appropriate IPO offer price would be 
challenging for underwriters and issuers, specifically in fixed-price mechanism 
compensate for a higher degree of 
information asymmetry among retail 
investors. Among the implications of 
this study’s findings include investor 
concerns on accounting information, 
especially leverage upon determining 
IPO value and IPO investment.
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markets where the offer price is determined before investors’ demands or opinion 
on the firms’ prospects are acquired. For this reason, diverse opinions are formed 
among investors towards the organisations’ values in the IPO market, resulting 
in the emergence of information asymmetries issues (Carey, Fang, & Zhang, 
2016). The investors attempt to determine the essential factors of IPO pricing as 
their confinement in “lemon” issue is not a favourable situation (Rock, 1986). 
With that being said, this article attempts to identify several relevant informative 
resources in determining IPO offer prices.
 It could be seen that prior to the recent Malaysian study, firms’ offer prices 
were determined according to specific public information. Specifically, Mohd-
Rashid, Masih, Abdul-Rahim, and Che-Yahya (2018) found that issuers offered 
their IPOs at discounted prices, provided if the firms were issued by prestigious 
underwriters and individuals who made high share allocations to institutional 
investors. Lower IPO prices offered by issuers and underwriters often attracted 
potential investors to subscribe to shares. Contrary to information which is 
publicly available in the firms’ prospectuses, no study has been conducted on 
the influence of pre-IPO accounting information on offer prices in the relatively 
high information asymmetry of the Malaysian IPO market. Therefore, this article 
attempts to provide further insights from Mohd-Rashid et al.’s (2018) study and 
findings from the literature about the capital structure of firms, specifically in 
terms of firms’ offer prices.
 Other than the study by Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018), previous studies were 
conducted on the factors of IPO pricing and evaluation. As a result, accounting 
information (Aggarwal et al., 2009; Cotter, Goyen, & Hegarty, 2005; Lai & Lo, 
2012; Sahoo & Rajib, 2012), signalling variables (Keasay & McGuinness, 1991; 
Leland & Pyle, 1977), and comparable firms of price-earnings (Cotter et al., 
2005; How et al., 2007; Kim & Ritter, 1999) were found to be the significant 
factors. However, no conclusive evidence was found regarding the influence 
of accounting information on IPO pricing in the Malaysian market. Therefore, 
it is required for this study to determine the informational role of accounting 
variables on IPO offer price in the context of the Malaysian market. The 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) introduced the implementation 
of the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) framework, effective 1 
January 2012. The framework implementation often enhances the transparency 
and credibility of financial reports. It could also be said that the prices are 
determined based on information acquired by underwriters and issuers in the 
fixed-price regime. For this reason, there may be differences in price valuation 
based on the accounting information reported in the pro-forma balance sheets of 
IPO prospectuses.
 This paper aims to provide further insights from the existing works of 
literature by identifying the accounting information incorporated into the pro-
forma balance sheets from IPO prospectuses. This information, for example the 
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information regarding leverage, was not focused in previous studies. Leverage 
represents the amount of debt raised by firms before IPOs. Provided that debt 
ratio is the indicator of a firm’s leverage, high-leverage firms possess higher 
uncertainties and financial risk to the market (Sahoo & Rajib, 2012). There is 
also a high possibility for IPOs to be overpriced. This phenomenon results in 
the lack of interest among institutional investors to subscribe to IPOs which 
issue greater debts. Meanwhile, a higher share portion of the high-leveraged 
IPOs would be allocated to retail investors. To illustrate this point, they might be 
confined in the “lemon” issue (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1996). Therefore, 
high-leveraged firms are assumed in this study to be risky. Therefore, issuers and 
underwriters should determine lower offer prices so that retail investors could 
achieve high risk-adjusted returns in the aftermarket. However, no studies have 
been conducted on the relationship between pre-IPO leverage and offer price in 
the Malaysian market. As the majority of Malaysian IPO prices are determined 
through fixed-price mechanism which displays higher information asymmetries 
(Yong, 2015), this study provides further insights on the investigation regarding 
the degree of the pre-IPO leverage influence on IPO offer price after other related 
factors are controlled.
 The present study found a negative significant coefficient on debt ratio 
after the estimation of IPO offer price. This finding indicated that underwriters 
and issuers determined high-leveraged IPOs at lower offer prices, thereby 
contributing to existing works of literature. To illustrate this point, the explanation 
of the results was based on information asymmetry theory (Rock, 1986). Provided 
that the firms issuing greater debts prior to IPO listing posed greater financial 
risks, high-leverage firms offered negative information to potential investors. In 
this case, institutional investors prevented the subscription of firms with greater 
information asymmetry. Therefore, underwriters and issuers placed discounts on 
IPO offer price to compensate for the higher extent of information asymmetry 
among retail investors. 
 This study consists of particular procedures. Section 2 illustrates the works 
of literature related to pre-IPO leverage and the developed hypothesis. Section 
3 presents data, methodology, and the variables used in this study including the 
model specification. This is followed by Section 4, which provides the results of 
analyses and discussion. Section 5 presents, the conclusion and implications of 
this study.
2.     Literature Review
Investors are usually provided with information on IPO offer price. Rock 
(1986) highlighted that the issue of “lemon” is prevalent in the IPO market as 
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institutional investors do not attempt to subscribe to IPOs offered with high 
prices. However, retail investors generally receive the allocation of shares either 
from firms which provide higher information asymmetries or small firms offered 
at high prices. Therefore, this article highlights that retail investors should obtain 
public information from the firms’ prospectuses to prevent the issue of “lemon”. 
This is because the investors have a chance of using the information to decide 
on share subscription. In respect of accounting information, this study could 
enhance understanding among investors on the informational role of leverage 
from the firms’ prospectuses as a signal device in offer prices before IPO listing. 
To attract investors into the IPO market, issuers and underwriters should place 
discounts on offer prices. However, the amount of compensation should be based 
on the degree of information asymmetry. To avoid the issue of “lemon” among 
investors, specifically retail investors, this study aims to reduce information 
asymmetry by identifying the potential signals of leverage in a firm’s prospectus 
to elaborate on its offer price.
 To explain the informational role of pre-IPO leverage on offer prices, this 
article presents several pieces of evidence on the link between pre-IPO leverage 
and IPO anomalies. Su (2004) reported that IPOs which issued greater debts 
posed a higher degree of underpricing in the Chinese market. It was implied that 
highly leveraged-IPOs posed higher financial risks. Therefore, retail investors 
receive compensation from the exposure to information asymmetry. This finding 
was supported by studies from Akyol, Cooper, Meoli and Vismara (2014), 
Chen, Wang, Li, Sun and Tong (2015), and Huang, Chiang, Lin and Lin (2017), 
who explained that higher leverage could increase the risk of financial distress. 
Furthermore, although the leverage issue was for capital raising purposes, high-
leverage firms could not deliver their superior qualities to the market. Meanwhile 
Kim, Pukthuanthong-Le and Walker (2007) focused on a sample of high and low 
technology firms in the U.S. market. As a result, a positive coefficient of pre-
IPO leverage was found when underpricing was estimated. This coefficient was 
due to the volatile operating cash flows of high-technology firms, besides their 
higher intangible assets (intellectual properties and patents) and low profitability. 
In this case, it was challenging for issuers to make repayment to debtors on 
time. Additionally, investors must be compensated due to their exposure to high 
information asymmetry in high-tech firms. In this regard, based on winner’s 
curse hypothesis, issuers should offer IPOs with low offer prices to compensate 
for higher information asymmetry on high leveraged IPOs. This assumption is 
in agreement with studies by Cotter et al. (2005), Lai and Lo (2012), Reber and 
Vencappa (2016) and Sahoo and Rajib (2012).
 Compared to higher pre-IPO leverage which poses a higher extent of 
information asymmetry, it is arguable that the higher leverage issued by the 
organisations serves as a better signal to the market. Kim et al. (2007) found a 
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negative coefficient on pre-IPO leverage in a sample of low-technology U.S. IPOs 
when underpricing was estimated. This coefficient could be explained through 
the capital structure signalling theory. Furthermore, firms have a preference for 
internal to external financing, such as debt, to raise funds for financing growth 
activities rather than equity financing. This situation is known as pecking-order 
hypothesis (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This hypothesis indicates that high leverage 
of firms could provide positive information to potential investors about their 
value. Therefore, based on the signalling theory, higher leverage issued by firms 
prior to IPOs often incurred high offer prices due to superior prospects of the 
firms.
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the prices of Malaysian IPOs are 
determined by a fixed-price mechanism, indicating that investors’ views on 
firms’ prospects are not incorporated in setting the offer price (Tajuddin et al., 
2015). A significant presence of information asymmetry on IPOs is implied 
in the aftermarket (Yong, 2015). Furthermore, leverage is claimed to be the 
determinant of financial survival (Ahmed Sheikh & Wang, 2011) if high debts 
are issued by firms prior to IPO listing. As a result, there is a high possibility for 
firms to face financial distress, indicating their most disadvantageous qualities 
to the market. Besides, investors would not desire to subscribe to high-risk 
IPOs. Based on the arguments on pre-IPO leverage, the information asymmetry 
theory was implemented in this study (Rock, 1986) to assume that underwriters 
often undervalue high-leveraged Malaysian IPOs. For this reason, issuers tend 
to set a lower IPO price so that investors are compensated from their exposed 
information asymmetry. The following is the hypothesis of the present study:
= There is a significant relationship between pre-IPO leverage and offer 
price.
3.     Methodology
A sample consisting of 168 IPOs listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2009 to 2018 
was employed in this study. The year of research, 2009 was selected for the 
elimination of sub-prime crisis effects to occur. Notably, this crisis occurred in 
2008. The contents of the data comprised several variables, such as offer price, 
pre-IPO accounting data, offer size, underwriter’s reputation, and IPO market 
conditions. All of the data were manually extracted from the organisations’ 
prospectuses.
Prior to hypothesis testing analysis, the present study highlighted the 
particular criteria for data collection. However, an exception was applied on IPOs 
with special types of offers, such as restricted offer-of sale to eligible employees 
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and indigenous (Bumiputra) investors, tender offer, and special issues (Mohd 
Rashid, Abdul-Rahim, & Yong 2014). Similarly, IPOs from selected industries 
sectors, namely, finance, real estate investment trusts (REITs), exchange-traded 
funds (ETF), and special purpose acquisition companies (SPAC) were excluded 
due to different presentation formats in financial statements. The exclusion of 
such data resulted in 150 IPOs as the final total sample in this study, which 
represented 86.31% of the overall IPOs listed from 2009 to 2018. The distribution 
of the sample of IPOs is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Selection Process of IPOs’ Sample from January 2009 to December 
2018.
Description Number of IPOs
Number of IPOs before exclusion 168
(-) Total number of IPOs issued through restricted offer-to-
sale, tender offer and special issues
6
(-) Total number of IPOs from finance sector 2
(-) Total number of IPOs from REITs sector 5
(-) Total number of IPOs from ETF sector 3
(-) Total number of IPOs from SPAC sector 6
Total number of Final IPO sample 150
3.1     Dependent Variable and Independent Variable
The dependent variable of this study was the offer price of IPO (OP) reported in 
the prospectus. The offer price of IPO functioned as the reference for potential 
investors’ decision-making on share subscription. It is claimed in this article that 
firms with high offer prices are generally large companies with higher information 
asymmetry, while those with low offer prices are usually small companies with 
lower information asymmetry. In this case, potential investors could perceive the 
indicator of the firms’ qualities in various ways.
In this study, leverage was the main variable which acted as an indicator in 
setting offer prices. They were obtained from the pro-forma of the firms’ balance 
sheet. In respect of the firms’ leverage, debt ratio (LEVERAGE) was used in 
this study. It was measured in the form of short and long-term total liabilities 
of the firms over the firms’ total assets. Sahoo and Rajib (2012) highlighted that 
leverage acts as a signal device of the firms’ financial strength. Underwriters 
often undervalue firms which obtain higher debts than equity, as high-leverage 
firms are perceived to have the most disadvantageous qualities. In line with 
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winner’s curse hypothesis, it is suggested that firms with high debt ratio can be 
identified as high-risk firms. As a solution, issuers and underwriters should set 
lower offer prices to compensate for the exposure to information asymmetry 
among retail investors.
3.2     Control Variables
In order to capture the influence of leverage on appropriate IPO pricing, six 
control variables were employed in this study. The first control variable of this 
study was the return on equity (ROE), which acted as the indicator of the firms’ 
profitability. Given that firms with greater profitabilty represented “good news” 
to investors, underwriters would determine the high ROE of the firms at high 
offer prices as this feature is regarded as the firms’ better qualities, based on 
signalling theory (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Welch, 
1989). The second control variable was the firm’s size (LNOFFSZ) through the 
total amount of shares issued. Given the firm’s size as a proxy of information 
asymmetry was justified by Mohd-Rahsid et al. (2018) and Yung and Zender 
(2010), large and mature firms possessed fewer uncertainties as compared to small 
and young firms, and hence capable of influencing IPO offer price. Meanwhile, 
the third control variable was the underwriter’s reputation (UNDWR), which was 
obtained from IPO prospectuses and Bloomberg. This variable was referred to 
the annual change in underwriters’ market shares. Given the prestigious work 
of underwriters as promoters to attract investors to subscribe IPOs was justified 
by Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018) whereby the offer price should be priced lower 
by underwriters to compensate investors for a higher degree of information 
asymmetry.
 The fourth control variable in this study was board types (BOARD), 
which was computed as a dummy variable. There are two main types of boards 
on Bursa Malaysia—Main Market and ACE Market. As discussed earlier, Yong 
(2015) highlighted that IPOs listed in the Main Market possessed lower levels 
of uncertainties compared to IPOs in the ACE Market. Therefore, underwriters 
should set a higher offer price for the IPOs listed in the Main Market. The next 
control variable was the dummy of pricing mechanism (BOOK) used in pricing 
IPOs. Although the majority of Malaysian IPOs was determined through a fixed-
price method, it was known in this study that small entities of IPOs were priced 
through book-building mechanisms, contributing to varied findings with fixed-
price IPOs. According to Kutsana and Smith (2004), book-built IPOs possessed 
fewer uncertainties due to soliciting investors’ demands during roadshows. 
Accordingly, this could reduce information asymmetry among the book-built 
IPOs and thus influenced the underwriters’ decision on setting offer prices
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 Finally, this study controlled IPO market conditions (IPOMKT) when 
IPO pricing. The market conditions indicated investors’ confidence in the stock 
market performances. The measurement by Kooli and Suret (2004) was adopted, 
where IPO market conditions was categorised as ‘‘hot’’ and ‘‘cold’’ markets. 
Investors had higher optimism and confidence with IPOs issued in the hot market 
(Helwege & Liang, 2004). Due to its potential for IPO success, the determined 
offer price is expected to be higher.
3.3     Model Specification
To examine the effect of accounting information on the offer price in the Malaysian 
market, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model was employed in the 
present study. The cross-sectional regression model is constructed as follows:
(1)
A summary of the variables’ measurements in Eq. (1) is provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Variables and Measurements
(continued)
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OPi  =  β0 + β1LEVERAGEi + β2ROEi + β3LNOFFSZi + β4UNDWRi +  β5BOARDi 
+ β6 BOOKi + β7 IPOMKTi + εi 
(1) 
 
The summary of the variables’ measurements in Eq. (1) was provided in Table 2. 
Table 2: Variables and Measurements.  
Variables Definition  
OPi Offer price of IPO 
 
LEVERAGEi  LEVERAGEi = 
Total Liabilities prior to incorporation of proceeds 
Total asset prior to incorporation of proceeds 
  
ROEi ROEi = Net Income prior a year of IPO listing Shareholder equity prior a year of IPO listing 
  
LNOFFSZi  LNOFFSZi = LN(Number of shares issued at the IPO x OP) 
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UNDWRi  The measurement based on Megginson and Weiss (1991) is 
described in the below formula:  
UNDWRi = UNDTi TOTUNDTi 
 
Where,  
UNDTi            =  Total underwriting amount for ith underwriters in  
                            the listing year, and 
TOTUNDTi    =  Total underwriting amount in ith listing year. 
 
Underwriters is considered as prestigious if the amount of proceeds 
raised by underwriters is greater than the average of the total 
underwriting amount in the particular year of listing. Thereby, a 
dummy variable takes a value of one if an IPO was issued by 
prestigious underwriter.  
 
UNDWRi = 
1 =IPO underwritten by prestigious underwriter 
0 =IPO underwritten by less reputable underwriter 
  
BOARDi BOARDi = 1 =IPO listed in Main Market  0 = IPO listed in ACE Market 
  
BOOKi BOOKi = 1=IPO issued by book-building mechanism 0 =IPO issued by fixed-price mechanism 
IPOMKTi IPOs are listed in hot market when the sum of the IPO offers 
exceeds the average of the sample issue size of the year listing. 
Henceforth, a dummy variable takes a value of one if an IPO was 
issued in hot market. 
 
IPOMKTi = 1 =IPO listed in the hot market 0 =IPO listed in the cold market 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
Prior to further empirical analysis, data cleansing process was conducted to 
eliminate the outliers of the IPO samples. Accordingly, 129 Malaysian IPOs 
were present for further empirical analysis. Table 3 presents the results of 
descriptive statistics on variables. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics. 
Notes: IPO sample size (N) = 129, starting from January 2009 to December 2018. Min= 
Minimum value; Maximum= Maximum value; s.d= Standard Deviation. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median Min Max s.d 
Offer Price (RM) 0.963 0.680 0.120 6.500 0.901 
Debt Ratio  0.443 0.456 172.6 0.833 0.199 
Return on Equity (percent) 27.068 24.824 3.297 89.187 14.596 
Proceeds (RM millions) 302 43.750 7.321 6370 833 
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4.      Analysis of Results
Prior to further empirical analysis, data cleansing process was conducted to 
eliminate outliers in the IPO samples. Accordingly, 129 Malaysian IPOs were 
present for further empirical analysis. Table 3 presents the results of descriptive 
statistics on variables.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Min Max s.d
Offer price (RM) 0.963 0.680 0.120 6.500 0.901
Debt ratio 0.443 0.456 172.6 0.833 0.199
Return on equity 
(percent)
27.068 24.824 3.297 89.187 14.596
Proceeds (RM million) 302 43.750 7.321 6370 833
Note: IPO sample size (N) = 129, starting from January 2009 to December 2018. Min= 
Minimum value; Maximum= Maximum value; s.d= Standard deviation.
 It was found that the average IPO offer price was RM 0.96, with a 
standard deviation of RM 0.90. Therefore, a high dispersion in offer prices 
was indicated. Based on the report by Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018) from 2000 to 
2014, the average value of IPO offer price was lower than the RM0.96. Abdul-
Rahim and Che-Embi (2013) reported that this value was lower than RM1.11 
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from 1999 to 2008. Notably, the maximum value for offer price amounted to 
RM6.50, as shown by Lotte Chemical Titan Holdings Berhad listed in 2017. 
Conversely, Pasukhas Group Berhad listed in 2012 reported that the minimum 
value for offer price amounted to RM 0.12. In respect of explanatory variable, 
it was found in this study that an organisation named Cypark Resources Berhad 
listed in 2010 issued the highest debt ratio at 0.833. Meanwhile, the lowest debt 
ratio at 172.6 was found in this study, represented by EA Holdings Berhad listed 
in 2010. Furthermore, the average debt ratio amounted to 0.443, indicating that 
approximately 44.48 per cent of total assets were used for financing prior to IPO 
listing. The average value of debt ratio was slightly higher than 0.416 according 
to Rashid, Ibrahim, Othman, and See (2012) from 2004 to 2008. Meanwhile, 
0.412 of debt ratio was found by Tajuddin, Abdullah, and Taufil-Mohd (2016) 
from 2005 to 2014. Nevertheless, the average debt ratio reported in this study 
was 0.51 lower, as reported by Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2016) from 2002 to 
2014 in the Malaysian IPO market.
 In respect of control variables, it was found that the average value for 
return on equity was 27.07 per cent, indicating that firms were capable of using 
their assets to generate profits at an average of 27.07 per cent to shareholders. 
Furthermore, the return on equity was at its minimum value of 3.30 per cent, 
while its maximum value amounted to 89.19 per cent. There was an average 
value of RM 302 million for the IPO proceeds, as reflected by the total amount 
raised by firms for IPOs in ringgit Malaysia. This value included the highest 
proceeds of RM 6370 million and the lowest proceeds of RM 7.321 million. 
Notably, this average figure was higher than the figure reported by Mohd-Rashid 
et al. (2014) from 2000 to 2012. It was also higher than the figure reported by 
Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi (2013) from 1999 to 2008 for the Malaysian IPO 
market.
 Table 4 illustrates the correlation matrix of all variables. Based on the 
table, it was found that most of the variables possessed a correlation lower 
than 0.7, with four pairs of the relationship as exceptions. The four relationship 
pairs included OP and LNOFFSZ, OP and BOOK, LNOFFSZ and BOOK, and 
LNOFFSZ and IPOMKT, which presented positive coefficients of: 0.807, 0.706, 
0.804, and 0.706, respectively. The occurrence of high coefficients indicated 
possible strong correlation between the two variables. Further analysis was 
conducted on the two variables using VIF (variance inflation factors) prior to 
regression analysis. The result showed that the VIF values for these variables 
were constantly lower than 9.52. This was a value below the 10.00 cut-off point 
(Gujarati, 2003; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). This value indicated the 
absence of multicollinearity issue in these variables. To ensure the reliability of 
the regression models and their results, diagnostic tests, such as the identification 
of autocorrelation issue (Durbin-Watson test) and heteroskedasticity test (White’s 
test) was performed to validate OLS assumptions.
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Table 4. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix Results between Variables.
OP 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. LEVERAGE -0.090
2. ROE 0.038 0.076
3. LNOFFSZ 0.807 0.293 -0.057
4. UNDRW 0.412 0.219 0.159 0.487
5. BOARD 0.497 0.091 -0.120 0.512 0.276
6. BOOK 0.706 0.241 -0.076 0.803 0.434 0.292
7. IPOMKT 0.520 0.252 -0.083 0.706 0.394 0.129 0.656
Note: OP = offer price; LEVERAGE = total liabilities (short-term + long-term liabilities) 
over total assets; ROE= return on equity; LNOFFSZ = natural logarithm of offer size; 
BOARD = dummy variable of market board; BOOK= Dummy variable of book-building 
method issue; IPOMKT= dummy variable of IPO market conditions; the numbers in the 
column headings correspond to the number of variables in the row headings.
Table 5 presents a comparison between high and low debt ratios in terms 
of mean differences. Specifically, the high debt ratio group displayed an average 
offer price of RM 0.92, while the low debt ratio group recorded an average offer 
price of RM 1.10. Furthermore, it was found that issuers determined the IPOs 
with low debt ratios at higher offer prices. Meanwhile, the level of leverage 
was highly diverse across high and low debt ratio groups. Specifically, the high 
debt ratio group possessed a mean leverage value of 67.4 per cent, while the 
mean leverage value of the low debt ratio group amounted to 20.1 per cent. 
The findings shown in Table 5 proved that the high return of equity and large 
shares offering were associated with high debt ratio IPOs. Moreover, prestigious 
underwriters showed a preference for issuing IPOs with high debt ratios. Firms 
issued through the book-building mechanism and those issued in the hot market 
possessed high debt ratios. There was a high mean difference for offer price, 
leverage, returns on IPO market conditions between the high and low debt ratio 
groups. The difference in equity, firm size, reputation of underwriters, dummy 
book-building, and dummy was at the level of 10 per cent or lower, with the 
dummy of market board as an exception.
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Table 5. Mean Difference between High and Low Debt Ratio IPOs.




Variable High Low t-statistics z-statistics
OP 0.916 1.097 -0.181 0.812* -1.850*
LEVERAGE 67.4 20.1 47.3 25.625*** -7.550***
ROE 0.306 0.245 0.061 1.824* -1.936*
LNOFFSZ 18.590 17.536 1.054 3.312*** -3.220***
UNDRW 0.530 0.260 0.270 2.494** -2.412**
BOARD 0.740 0.670 0.070 0.666 -0.668
BOOK 0.290 0.050 0.240 2.904*** -2.771***
IPOMKT 0.320 0.080 0.240 2.739*** -2.629***
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent levels, respectively. According to Fama and French’s (1993), this study segregated 
the high and low debt ratios by taking IPOs with the lowest debt ratio quartile (30 per cent 
lowest from the sample) and represented them as low-debt ratio portfolio whereas IPOs 
in the highest debt ratio quartile (30 per cent highest from the sample) to be represented 
as high-debt ratio portfolio.
Table 6 illustrates the findings from the cross-sectional regressions 
regarding the estimation of IPO offer price through leverage and profitability 
variables. No autocorrelation issue was present after the implementation of the 
correction by the Newey-West method as the Dublin-Watson value amounted 
to 1.7959. The adjusted R-squared value for the regression model was 68.58 
per cent. It was inferred from this figure that all explanatory variables could 
elaborate on the variations in IPO offer price in the model, which amounted to at 
least 68.58 per cent. Additionally, the F-statistics values for the regression model 
were significant, and the goodness-of-fit of models (p<0.01) were validated.
The coefficients of predicting variables involved an explanatory variable 
known as debt ratio. These coefficients were placed in the respective directions 
as predicted in the hypothesis presented in Table 5. The directions of all the 
coefficients of predicting variables in all models were as per prediction, with 
the IPO market condition (IPOMKT) as the exception. However, the debt ratio 
did not affect the offer price set as the results obtained were insignificant. In 
respect of leverage variable, a negative coefficient was reported on debt ratio 
(LEVERAGE) when the offer price was estimated. Therefore, hypothesis H  was 
accepted in this study. It was indicated from this finding that high debt ratios in 
the firms’ balance sheets led underwriters and issuers to set a low offer price, 
1
14                                     The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 15, No 1, 2020 : 1-19
while the low debt ratios prompted them to set a high offer price. This finding 
could be explained through information asymmetry theory (Rock, 1986).
 
Table 6. Regression Results for Pre-Ipo Leverage Model for 129 Malaysian Ipos, 
Listed from January 2009 to December 2018.
Variable Coefficient t-statistics p-value
LEVERAGE -0.7110 -1.8131* 0.0723
ROE 0.2048 0.7752 0.4398
LNOFFSZ 0.4040 3.7621*** 0.0003
UNDRW 0.0371 0.3928 0.6951
BOARD 0.2177 1.7067* 0.0904
BOOK 0.5090 3.1622*** 0.0020
IPOMKT -0.1577 -0.9110 0.3641




Note: Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems are determined by conducting 
Dublin-Watson test and White test, respectively followed with correction by Newey-West 
Covariance Estimator. The highlighted adjusted values with the symbols: *, ** and *** 
represent significance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 Moreover, high-leverage firms were exposed to higher financial risks, 
such as financial distress (Wang et al., 2015). High financial risks in firms 
were associated with higher information asymmetries, offering their most 
disadvantageous qualities to the market (Su, 2004). Subsequently, even when the 
organisations appeared in public, institutional investors would not be interested 
in subscribing to them. This was due to their awareness that high-leveraged firms 
would be overpriced after the IPO listing. In contrast, retail investors would 
receive share allocations from high-leveraged IPOs as they were not informed 
about the firms’ prospects. As most Malaysian IPOs were determined by a fixed-
price mechanism, underwriters and issuers offered high-leveraged IPOs at low 
offer prices to compensate for investors who were trapped in "curses". These 
findings were in agreement with Reber and Vencappa (2016) and Peng and Wang 
(2007).   
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Significant results were found between three control variables and IPO offer 
price. Specifically, firm size (LNOFFSZ) had a significant positive association 
with IPO offer price. Therefore, it was indicated that a high number of new 
shares offered by large firms displayed lower information asymmetries. These 
findings were in agreement with Yung and Zender (2010) and Mohd-Rashid et al. 
(2018). Subsequently, higher IPO prices were set to indicate the firms’ qualities. 
Furthermore, it was suggested from the results about board types (BOARD) in 
the regression model that the IPOs listed in the Main Market were related to 
significant high offer prices. According to Yong (2015), the IPOs listed in the 
ACE Market were exposed to high information asymmetries due to insufficient 
information on the firms’ track record and challenges in securing conventional 
sources of finance. For this reason, underwriters set higher offer prices for the 
IPOs listed in the Main Market.
 It was indicated from the results for dummy book-building (BOOK) that 
the IPOs priced by the book-building mechanism were positively related to offer 
prices. This finding was supported by Kutsana and Smith (2004), who proposed 
that book-built IPOs possessed low information asymmetries as investors’ 
demands were acquired by underwriters during road shows. As for Malaysia, 
large and developed firms used book-building mechanisms to issue IPOs for 
improvement in the credibility of firms’ signal qualities. Therefore, issuers set 
high offer prices for book-built IPOs.
 Other control variables, such as return on equity (ROE) and underwriter 
reputation (UNDWR) were positively related to IPO offer price. However, they 
displayed insignificant results. The positive coefficient on ROE suggested that 
issuers and underwriters often set high offer prices for firms with high ROE 
prior to IPO listing. Therefore, it was indicated that investors had a preference 
for the subscription of IPOs with higher profitability as the signal of firms was 
more superior. In respect of underwriter reputation (UNDWR), the positive signs 
indicated that high-priced IPOs were offered, provided if they were issued by 
prestigious underwriters. In this case, prestigious underwriters were employed 
to reduce information asymmetries according to certification theory (Carter & 
Manaster, 1990). Such findings contradicted with Mohd-Rashid et al. (2018) who 
reported a negative coefficient on underwriter reputation when estimating offer 
price. Another control variable, namely IPO market conditions (IPOMKT) had 
a negative insignificant relationship with IPO offer price. Optimistic investors 
were supposed to garner interests in IPOs issued in the hot market, resulting in 
a high offer price being set. However, the negative sign indicated underwriters 
and issuers’ expectations that investors would be interested in the subscription 
of IPOs with low offer price. Therefore, issuers arranged their listing in the hot 
market while promoting low offer price of IPOs to investors.
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5.     Conclusion
Determining an appropriate offer price is a challenging task for underwriters and 
issuers. The concerns of issuers and underwriters about accounting variable based 
on pro-forma financial statements in IPO prospectuses might influence offer 
prices compared to non-financial information. This study aims to investigate the 
influence of pre-IPO leverage on offer price by employing a sample of 130 IPOs 
listed on Bursa Malaysia. This study began from January 2009 to December 
2018, which was the duration after the sub-prime crisis in 2008. Based on the 
cross-sectional regression analysis, a negative coefficient of pre-IPO leverage 
was found when the IPO offer price was estimated. Therefore, it was indicated 
that organisations which issued high debts prior to IPO listing posed a higher 
extent of financial risks. These risks were associated with higher information 
asymmetries. Subsequently, institutional investors would not be interested in the 
IPO subscription despite the public appearance of the firms. Consequently, retail 
investors received the allocation of shares from high-leveraged IPOs. In the case 
of Malaysian IPOs, their cost was mostly determined by fixed-price mechanism. 
Additionally, underwriters and issuers offered high-leveraged IPOs at low offer 
price to compensate for investors who were trapped in “curses”.
 The implication of this study could be seen from the findings regarding 
accounting information, specifically the leverage variable that investors need to 
consider when valuing IPOs and making decisions about share subscription. This 
study’s findings have also resulted in guidelines for regulators when approving 
offer prices of listed firms. These guidelines would help ensure the effectiveness 
of offer prices in protecting shareholders’ interests. It is recommended that 
future studies focus on other influencing factors of IPO offer price through the 
introduction of lock-up provision.
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